We propose that the packaging of mandatory binding arbitration clauses as a condition of employment masks the true price of these agreements due to a mismatch in the available leverage of firms and employees in many markets.
To increase the efficiency of the market for the waiver of legal rights of redress to wrongdoing by private parties, we propose that mandatory binding arbitration clauses as a condition of employment shall be prohibited and struck out as null and void. Binding arbitration agreements shall then be negotiated between employers and employees, offering material compensation, allowing them to float in price so that the market can work efficiently and determine the true price of cyberpunk dystopia.
How do you prevent the company from simply firing anyone who does not sign the arbitration agreement in a week?
Well I tagged that as #shtpost for a reason.
My actual proposal depends on just how much power I’m being given to reshape the economy.
Assuming I could only impact arbitration, my move would be to require compensation at a minimum of $4,000 per-employee annually or X% of salary, whichever is greater, pro-rated by the number of hours compared to fulltime employment. Or something along those lines, perhaps. Maybe. I’d have to think about it.
My temptation is to set a huge “anti-monopoly trap” instead that triggers when the amount of binding arbitration in a district exceeds a certain percentage and tragedy of the commons the companies for irony purposes, but of course that’s a bad idea.
But the real move, with greater power, would be to severely limit binding arbitration and make all employers take out employment health and safety insurance for all employees (and for their products) while reducing regulations and creating a special court system and regulatory regime for the insurance that pays out much more regularly than one-sided corporate arbitration would. I would then require that the workplace health and safety insurance amount be listed prior to employment, informing prospective employees of just how dangerous the job is. This would all be occurring in a scenario where wage subsidies reduced working class desperation by increasing available jobs. (That would have its own program.)
This specialized insurance court system would be streamlined to lower the regulatory legal burden on both companies and individuals, while making it easier to file and resolve legitimate claims. It would be possible to appeal to higher levels of courts as well.
This would accomplish the stated goals of binding arbitration - reducing regulatory burden, reducing legal expenses on small matters without overloading the court system, etc - while wrecking the unstated goals of screwing over employees and consumers.
It also distributes the costs in a smoother, more predictable way. (That is, your bakery in specific doesn’t end up on the hook for $100,000 just because there’s a one in a million risk of a $100,000 bakery injury, and your bakery just happens to be the one it happened to.)